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Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
 
 
Abstract 
  
Researchers have recognized that interpersonal trust consists of different dimensions.  
These dimensions suggest that trust can be rational, cognitive, or affective.  Affect, which 
includes moods and emotions, is likely to have a direct impact on the affective 
dimension.  On the other hand, there are also studies showing that affect indirectly 
influence cognitive judgments.  Nonetheless, in this chapter we argue that the impact of 
affect on judgment will not be the same on all individuals.  In effect, the impact varies, 
depending on the individual‟s attention to affect, motivation to use or guard against 
affect, or regulation of affect.  All this may suggest that an individual‟s abilities or 
tendencies to manage affect will have implication on his or her trust relationships with 
others. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust is a topic that covers a wide range of phenomena.  For example, it can be related to 
organizations, to a profession, and to various other social, political, and economic institutions 
(Cook, 2001).  This means that the target of trust can either be personal (i.e. another person) 
or impersonal (e.g. a government).  Even within an organization, trust can be depersonalized 
in the sense that it can be based on a category of a group of people, or a particular role in a 
company, or a system of formal and informal rules (Kramer, 1999).  However, the focus of 
this chapters is on how individual difference in emotional attributes can have an impact on 
interpersonal trust.  Recently, a number of studies have investigated the relationship between 
affect and trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Forgas & East, 2008; Lount, 2010) but few have 
focused on emotional attributes.  
Dirks and Ferrin (2002) have pointed out that most definitions of interpersonal trust seem 
to be derived from a common conceptual core (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  
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According to Rousseau et al. (1998), trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another” (p. 395).  Nonetheless, some scholars have recognized that different 
operational definitions have been used by different researchers and this may suggest that trust 
comprises multiple dimensions (e.g. McAllister, 1995; Clark & Payne, 1997).  The following 
section will first discuss different dimensions of trust, which include rational, relational, 
cognitive, and affective dimensions.  Second, the linkage betweeen affect and some of these 
dimensions will be expounded.  Third, the individual difference in response to affect will be 
examined.     
 
 
2.  DIMENSIONS OF TRUST 
 
One of the dimensions of trust is tied to its relationship with rational choice.  Williamson 
(1993) claimed that individuals make trust choices based on rationally derived costs and 
benefits.  His claim is often referred to as calculative-based trust (McKnight, Cummings, & 
Chervany, 1998).  Similarly, Hardin‟s (2001) definition of trust stated that an individual trusts 
a target person because the former party believes the latter has some reason to act in the 
interests of the former.  Despite its persuasiveness, it has been found that many of the 
assumptions of rational choice models are empirically untenable (Kramer, 1999).  For 
instance, McEvily, Weber, Bicchieri, & Ho (2006) reported that in experiments that have 
used trust games, people seldom make pure rational choices.  In line with this, Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser (2004) found that individuals were more willing to take part in a game when the 
outcome was purely based on chance than when the outcome depended on the trustworthiness 
of another party, even though the probabilities of both were set to be the same.  Another 
similar experiment found that individuals collectively underestimated the percentage of 
others‟ trustworthiness by 30 to 35% (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2008).   
One of the reasons for the limitation of the rational trust model may be that it overstates 
decision-makers‟ cognitive capacities and the degree to which decision-makers engage in 
conscious calculations (March, 1994).  Therefore, other researchers have argued that the 
rational trust model should be complemented by a relational trust model, which includes a 
social orientation toward other people (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McAllister, 1995; 
Kramer, 1999).  On the other hand, some researchers have categorized interpersonal trust into 
two dimensions, of which one is cognitve and the other is affective (McAllister, 1995; Dirks 
& Ferrin, 2002).  Cognitive trust concerns the competence, integrity, and benevolence of a 
target person (Mayer et al., 1995), whereas affective trust reflects that a person has a personal 
interest of the welfare of another person (McAllister, 1995).  Rational trust and cognitive trust 
are related, even though sometimes rational trust is more focused on the costs and benefits of 
a trust decision whereas cognitive trust is more related to the evaluation of another party‟s 
trustworthiness.  Affective trust is very similar to relational trust, except that the latter 
sometimes encompasses the orientation not only towards another individual but also towards 
the society as a whole (Kramer, 1999). 
A number of studies have demonstrated that affective trust exists and can be 
distinguished from cognitive trust (e.g. Erdem & Ozen, 2003; Johnson & Grayson, 2005; 
Webber, 2008).  Researchers believe that affective trust is predicated on moods, feelings, and 
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emotions (Hansen, Morrow, & Batista, 2002; Johnson & Grayson, 2005).  In a relationship 
characterized by affective trust, strong emotional bonds are developed between parties 
through the constant expression of care and concern during their repeated interactions 
(McAllister, 1995; Erdem & Ozen, 2003; Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Webber, 2008).  Once 
such a trust is developed, it can persist in the long run (Webber, 2008).  Nonetheless, the 
following section will try to argue that affect plays a role not only in affective trust but also in 
cognitive trust. 
 
 
3 AFFECT AND TRUST 
 
Forgas (1995) pointed out that there is little agreement about how best to define variables 
such as affect, feeling
1
, emotion, and mood
2
.  For the purpose of this chapter, affect is used as 
an overarching category that includes both moods and emotions (Forgas, 1995; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Andrade & Ariely, 2009).  As we have seen, mood and emotion are already 
an integral part of the affective trust (McAllister, 1995).  On the other hand, affect can also 
directly and indirectly influence cognitive trust.  According to Forgas (1995), affect 
influences cognitive judgment through two routes: affect-as-information and affect-priming.  
Affect-as-information postulates that individuals use their affect as a heuristic cue for 
informing themselves (Clore & Gasper, 2001).  An example is that when people decide 
whether they can initially trust someone, they may just decide by examining the feelings that 
they have toward that person (Jones & George, 1998).  Alternatively, affect-priming 
indirectly influences a cognitive judgment by selective attention, encoding, retrieval, and 
association of information in the processing of a cognitive judgment (Forgas, 1995).  This can 
explain why feelings and emotions may color one‟s experience of trust and influence one‟s 
subsequent cognition (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Moreover, Williams (2007) identified that 
the feelings concerning threats to one‟s interest or identity forestall trust building.  In line 
with this, Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan (2005) claimed that intense fears of embarrassment 
will negatively affect one‟s trusting acts.  In short, affect can incidentally influence one‟s 
judgment and decision making beyond conscious awareness (Andrade & Ariely, 2009).  
Previous studies have found that both short-term and long-term effects of affect have an 
influence on individuals‟ decision making processes (Forgas, 2001).  In the short-run, 
emotions signal the need for changing one‟s action tendency (Frijda, 1988).  When a person is 
overwhelmed by negative emotions, he or she tends to refrain from making decisions (Luce, 
1989).  Moreover, it seems that the short-term influence of emotion on decision is not 
confined to the time when the emotion is present.  In another experiment, Andrade and Ariely 
(2009) discovered that a decision based on transient emotions can become the basis of a 
                                                        
1
 Some have tried to distinguish the subtle difference among feeling, emotion, and mood.  For example, Soloman 
(2000) argued that feeling is not sufficient to yield emotion but an emotion is basically a feeling.  Likewise, 
Pettinetti (2009) asserted that feelings are not necessarily described in terms of emotions but emotions are strong 
feelings. Some have defined emotion and mood both in terms of feeling where mood represents weaker feeling 
(Andrade & Ariely, 2009).      
2
 There are similarities and differences between moods and emotions.  Larsen (2000) argued that both moods and 
emotions are felt or sensed by a person to some extent.  Moreover, they are expressed through facial or non-facial 
channels and stimulate physiological response.  On the other hand, moods are different from emotions in that 
they tend to be more diffuse, last longer, and typically do not have a distinct cause (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
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subsequent decision even though the decision-maker has undergone some emotion-
neutralization exercise.  This study suggests that emotions may also have a long-term effect 
on individuals‟ decisions.  The reason is that emotions are integrated into the context of a 
remembered event (Parrot & Spackman, 2000).   Anecdotal evidence has shown that people 
can vividly recall the emotional details of a betrayal experience even up to thirty years after 
the incident occurred (Robinson et al., 2004; Piper & Monin, 2006).  Painful experience has 
also been linked to counterfactual thoughts (Miller & Taylor, 2002).   
In addition, there have been a number of studies that specifically provide the link 
between affect and trust behaviors, risk assessments, and trust-related judgments (e.g. 
Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1995; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). 
 
 
3.1. Affect and Cooperation, Risk Assessments, and Trust-related Judgments 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that affect has a significant impact on cooperation in 
negotiation.  Carnevale and Isen (1986) found that a positive mood is normally associated 
with a person‟s adoption of constructive and cooperating bargaining strategies in face-to-face 
negotiation.  Forgas (1998) also reported similar results.  In an experiment, participants in a 
happy mood tended to adopt a cooperative instead of a competitive strategy in negotiation, 
whereas participants in a sad mood tended to do the opposite.  These studies demonstrate that 
differences in moods alter a person‟s psychological condition that causes the intention to 
cooperate.   
Risk is one of the essential psychological conditions in trust (Rousseau et al., 1998) since 
trust involves the acceptance of vulnerability (Mayer et al., 1995).  Empirical evidence has 
discovered that the assessment of risks is influenced by affect.  Isen and Geva  (1987) found 
that people in a postive affect-induced group and in a control group assign different 
probabilities to winning a bet.  Bohner and Weinerth (2001) have shown that negative affect 
increases the extent to which people scrutinize information, whereas positive affect decrease 
it.  As a result, it is reasonable to postulate that risks associated with trust are also subject to 
the influence of feeling and emotion. 
A number of recent studies have investigated the impact of affect and trust-related 
judgments. Forgas and East (2008) revealed that a person‟s suspicion of another party is 
affected by the mood he or she experiences.  When asked to judge whether a person had 
committed a theft and denied the incident, sad participants were more likely than neutral and 
happy participants to judge the target person as guilty.  Perhaps the most salient evidence that 
a person‟s affective state can influence his or her disposition to trust was reported by Dunn 
and Schweitzer (2005).  In their experiment, participants were recruited at a railway station 
and were asked to undergo an affect induction exercise that induced anger, sadness and 
happiness respectively by describing a past incident.  They were then asked to rate the 
trustworthiness of a previously identified unfamiliar co-worker.  The results showed that 
participants in the happy condition were more trusting than those in the sad and angry 
conditions.    
All these studies suggest that the underlying psychological condition that causes trust can 
in turn be influenced by one‟s affective states.  However, it is believed that not all individuals 
are equally influenced by these states.  Some have argued that the integrated functioning of 
emotional and rational capacities within a person will make a difference in how the individual 
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adapts across different situations (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000).  This 
integrated functioning is sometimes referred to as a combination of a hot/cool system 
(Mischel & Ayduk, 2004) or associate-processing/reasoning system (Smith & Kirby, 2001).  
The hot or associate-processing system is a quick and automatic emotional processing system, 
which is useful for survival from an evolutionary perspective (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004).  This 
system is referred to as System 1 in the judgment and decision making literature (Price & 
Norman, 2008).  The cool or reasoning system, on the other hand, involves a more controlled 
and deliberate thinking process that is more flexible but relatively slow (Smith & Kirby, 
2001).  This system is labeled as System 2 (Price & Norman, 2008).  According to Price and 
Norman (2008), these two systems do not work independently.  Rather, the signal generated 
by System 1 may be heeded or ignored by System 2 and this provides the individual with 
some flexibility in controlling the influence of affect.  An individual‟s judgment and behavior 
thus depend on the interaction between these two systems, which are comprised of the 
following determinants: attention to affect, motivation to use affect or guard against affect, 
and regulation of affect.  Figure 1 gives a summary of the inter-relations among these factors. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Integrated Effects of Affective and Cognitive Systems on Judgment and Behavior 
 
4. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE WITH REGARD TO AFFECT 
 
4. 1. Attention to Affect 
 
It has been revealed that mood affects an individual‟s judgment mainly because it has 
little cognitive content (Forgas, 1995).  In other words, it is due to individuals‟ lack of 
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attention to the existence of mood that results in its influence on judgment.  Schwarz & Clore 
(1983) have shown a classic example of how one‟s judgment can be shaped by one‟s mood 
and how the judgment will be corrected once the attention to the mood is aroused.  When 
people were asked to judge their life satisfaction, they reported significantly higher 
satisfaction under sunny days.  However, such a difference in satisfaction became 
insignificant when the interviewer directly or indirectly mentioned the possible influence of 
weather.  This study demonstrates that the arousal of attention incites people to make 
adjustments in their judgments. 
In effect, people are different in their attention to affect.  Gasper and Clore  (2000) 
reported that individuals who were high or low in the attention to affect reacted differently to 
the presence of a mood in forming their judgments of risk.  Another study showed that in 
facing the same incident where emotions were involved, people tackled the situation 
differently in terms of affect (Perry & Ball, 2005).  Some people immediately took their own 
and other parties‟ affects into account when forming a solution.  Other people, on the other 
hand, tended to regard the affective context as irrelevant and just concentrated on how to 
rectify the situation.  Such a difference is likely to have different impact on the quality of 
interaction between the parties in the incident. 
In another study, Seo and Barrett (2007) discovered that stock investors who were better 
able to identify and distinguish their current affect achieved higher decision-making 
performance.  Members from investment clubs were invited to participate in an investment 
simulation.  In each of twenty business days in a row, they were provided with stock and 
market information.  Subsequently, they were required to make investment decisions and rate 
their affect.  It was found that those who better understood their affects achieved better results 
than those who chose to ignore theirs.  Therefore, the attention to affect seems to have an 
impact on the quality of judgments. 
 
 
4.2. Motivation to Use Affect or Guard against Affect 
 
Affects can be used because they serve a number of adaptive functions.  First, they serve 
as signals that one should give some unattended goal a higher priority than the current focal 
goal (Simon, 1967).  For example, anxiety about an examination may urge a student to stop 
watching TV but to start studying.  Second, affects shift our attention to the critical features of 
our environment, for example, to threats that evoke strong emotions (Leary, 2004). Third, 
Darwin argued that affects energize adaptive behaviors such as flight in the presence of fear 
or procreation in the presence of love (as cited in Salovey et al., 2000).  Overall, affects can 
motivate people in forming their judgments, decisions, and actions. 
Nonetheless, not all affects are adaptive (Leary, 2004).  It is not uncommon to discover 
that cooperation is sometimes sabotaged by an explosion of anger (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004), 
even though it has never been the intention of the parties involved.  Moreover, Forgas (1998) 
has shown that affective states may lead to mistaken judgments and decisions.  Under these 
circumstances, it is advisable for people to guard against the deleterious effects of affect. 
There are two common situations where individuals will try to use or guard against their 
emotions.  The first situation concerns the desire to attain a goal.  Sometimes, there are 
conflicts between the urge induced by affect and the desire of goal attainment.  The most 
common case is the delay of gratification that can be illustrated through the studies of 
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children (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004).  For example, each child is offered one cookie 
immediately or two cookies if they are willing to wait for a period of time.  The children are 
then facing a dilemma: either enjoy one piece now (the urge) or two pieces later (better 
outcome).  Similar situations can also occur in adults‟ daily lives.  For example, in a job 
interview an interviewee may try to prohibit the explosion of anger in face of an interviewer‟s 
provocation.  Because of the strong desire to attain a goal, Law, Wong, Huang, and Li (2008) 
claimed that some employees will cheer themselves and others up when they realize that a 
positive mood will assist them to get the job done.  Likewise, Forgas (1995) has argued that 
when a person is influenced by a strong motivation to accomplish a purpose, there is limited 
scope for one‟s affective state to affect one‟s judgment.   
The second situation where an individual may use his or her affects or guard against them 
is in social interaction. Vohs & Ciarocco (2004) argued that people restrain affective 
responses in order to gain acceptance in social group relationships.  An example is that people 
tend to cheer themselves up when they are about to go to a party but inhibit their feeling of 
happiness when they are about to go to a funeral (Erber & Erber, 2001).   Erber, Wegner, & 
Therriault (1996) reported that people are likely to regulate their moods in preparation for 
their engagement in social interaction.  On the other hand, one may lose the motivation to 
regulate one‟s own affect if one is socially isolated.  An example is that people who 
experience rejection from a group will tend to reveal self-destructive behaviors such as giving 
up early in solving problems (Vohs & Ciarocco, 2004).   
 
 
4.3. Regulation of Affect 
 
Eisenberg (2002) defined emotion-related regulation as “the process of initiating, 
avoiding, inhibiting, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, intensity, or duration 
of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological processes, emotion-related goals, 
and/or behavioral concomitants of emotion, generally in the service of accomplishing one‟s 
goals” (as cited in Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky, & Spinrad, 2004, p. 260).   While an 
individual may have the motivation to regulate his or her affects, he or she may not be able to 
do so.  James (1890) argued that people may have the motivation, but not the ability, or vice 
versa, to regulate their own affects (as cited in Mischel & Ayduk, 2004).  There is evidence 
suggesting that some people who are motivated to regulate their affects in effect make things 
worse.  For example, when people suppress their negative emotions, their emotional reactions 
will be prolonged or even intensified afterwards (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).  Similarly, 
those who tend to ruminate following a stressful event are associated with longer and more 
severe periods of depressed moods (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997).  Others 
who try to use venting to reduce anger are found to have more aggressive responding 
(Bushman, 2002). 
Nonetheless, some people are successful in regulating their affects, both during and after 
the occurence of an emotion-eliciting event.  Regulating affect during the occurence of an 
event is important because the undesired affective influences on judgment can be minimized 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Ciarrochi & Blackledge, 2006; Law et al., 2008).  For example, 
distraction has been found to be one of the effective strategies in dealing with the dilemma 
faced in the delay of gratification.  A study has revealed that it would be much easier for 
children to wait when they were distracted from the rewards (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 
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1972).  The second effective strategy to regulate affect during the occurence of an event is 
cognitive reappraisal.  Cognitive reappraisal involves a cognitive change in the interpretation 
of a potentially emotion-eliciting situation so that its affective impact is alleviated (Lazarus & 
Alfert, 1964; Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  It means that the 
regulation of affect is evoked at the early stage of the emotion-generation process. This 
regulation of affect changes the subsequent trajectory of affective responses (Gross, 1998; 
Richards & Gross, 2000; Gross & John, 2003; Schutte, Manes, & Malouff, 2009).   
After the occurrence of an emotion-eliciting event, people may use a number of effective 
strategies targeting the alleviation of the affective impact.  Erber and Erber (1994) have found 
that when individuals were asked to recall a mood-incongruent event using effort, they 
experienced a great change in mood.  Actually, tasks that are cognitively taxing will have 
similar alleviating effects.  Individuals solving difficult math problems or difficult anagrams 
can neutralize the negative affect (as cited in Erber & Erber, 2001).  This is possibly because 
such tasks serve as a distraction from the negative affect (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  Other 
strategies that provide similar effects include physical exercise, socializing, and downward 
comparison (Erber & Erber, 2001; Larsen & Prizmic, 2004).  
Nonetheless, since affects are integrated into the context of a remembered event (Parrot 
& Spackman, 2000), a full recovery from an emotion-eliciting event is achieved only when 
thoughts about the event no longer generate a negative affective response (Shepherd, 2003).  
Otherwise, the negative event will continue to challenge one‟s thoughts and feelings (Salovey 
et al., 2000).  One of the effective strategies that can be used in order to recover from a 
negative event is trying to reinterpret or redefine the event in non-affective terms (Wranik, 
Barrett, & Salovey, 2007; Boss & Sims, 2008).  Examples include viewing a situation from a 
different perspective or persuading oneself that the objective situation was not as bad as one 
imagined (Loewenstein, 2007).  Alternatively, one may even try to find positive meanings 
connected to a negative event (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Loewenstein, 2007). 
 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS 
 
As we have seen, an individual‟s judgment on which affect has an impact depends on 
whether the individual pays attention to the affect, uses or guards against the affect, or 
regulates the affect.  Some people may be attentive to affects so that they are more motivated 
to correct the biases before reaching a judgment.  Others may be motivated to maintain 
positive affects or guard against harmful ones so that they pay more attention to and regulate 
them in order to minimize their adverse impact.   Whatever path it is taken, the differences in 
individuals‟ abilities or tendencies in dealing with affects may produce different judgments 
even in the same situation.  Some researchers have therefore claimed that individual 
differences in emotional intelligenc or emotional competence will have different impact on 
trust-related judgments (Goleman, 1995; Druskat & Wolff, 2001). 
As defined by Mayer and Salovey (1997), emotional intelligence (EI) involves four 
abilities: (1) the ability to accurately perceive and express emotions of self and others, (2) the 
ability to understand emotions and their progression, (3) the ability to generate feelings to 
assist thinking, and (4) the ability to regulate and manage emotions. Although EI highlights 
the term „emotion‟, it also takes into account other affects such as feelings and moods (Mayer 
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& Salovey, 1997; Mayer, 2001). The first two abilities correspond to the attention to affect.  
The third one corresponds to motivation, whereas the fourth one correponds to regulation.  
Several reasons have been proffered for the claim that EI is contributive to trust builing.  
First, emotionally intelligent individuals are likely to take others‟ feelings into account during 
personal interactions (Druskat & Wolff, 2001; Perry & Ball, 2005).  This argument is partly 
supported by studies that showed a positive relationship between EI and empathy (Schutte et 
al., 2001: Jordan et al, 2002).  Second, others claimed that those who are less emotionally 
intelligent are less trusted by others because they may tend to render inept criticism to others 
(Goleman, 1995).  This again is partly supported by evidence that revealed that emotionally 
intelligent people are less likely to exhibit deviant behaviors such as fighting with others 
(Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004).  Third, a number of studies have found a positive 
relationship between emotional intelligence and agreeableness (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 
2003; Lopes, Brackett, Nezlek, Schutz, Sellin, & Salovey, 2004; Lopes, Salovey, Cote, & 
Beers, 2005).  Agreeableness is one of the five dimensions in the Big-Five Personality model 
and is connected with dispositional trust (Mooradian, Renzl, & Matzler, 2006).  Fourth, 
another study has demonstrated that trust among group members is highly associated with 
leaders‟ emotionally competent behavior such as interpersonal understanding (Druskat & 
Pescosolido, 2006).  All these suggest that individual difference in emotional intelligence may 
have an impact on trust-related judgments.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has delineated that trust comprises of different dimensions, which include 
rational, cognitive, affective, and relational.  Rational or cognitive trusts concern the costs and 
benefits of a trust decision, as well as the deliberate evaluation of another party‟s 
trustworthiness.  Nonetheless, these models of trust are empirically untenable (Kramer, 1999).  
In effect, they should be complemented by relational or affective trust, which takes the 
emotional bond between the parties into account.  On the one hand, moods, feelings, and 
emotions are an integral part of relational or affective trusts.  On the other hand, these affects 
can also indirectly influence the cognitive trust.  A number of empirical studies have found 
that affect influences trust-related judgments and decisions.  These include the adoption of 
cooperative bargaining strategies, the scrutiny of information, and the evaluation of another 
individual‟s trustworthiness.   
Nonetheless, we also argue that not all individuals are equally influenced by affects.  This 
is because within an individual, both System 1 and System 2 are at work.  The affects may 
serve as signals generated by System 1 but System 2 enables an individual to decide whether 
to follow such signals (Price & Norman, 2008).  First, an individual‟s decision may depend 
on whether he or she pays attention to the affects.  Previous studies have found that some 
individuals are more alerted to the presence of affects and such recognition will make a 
difference in judgment.  Second, an individual may also be motivated to use affects or guard 
against the influence of affects.  Third, different people may use different strategies in 
regulating affects in the formulation of judgments and decisions.  In summary, the individual 
difference in the knowledge, ability, or disposition to deal with affects may result in an 
individual‟s difference in his or her trusting approach or evalution of others‟ trustworthiness.  
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